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Abstract
This Article reviews the Special 301 provisions and their implementation to date. Special
301 is designed to use the credible threat of unilateral retaliation by the United States to persuade
trading partners to reform currently deficient IP practices. The article praises the US’s use of
Special 301 use thus far but warns against taking harsher action.
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INTRODUCTION
On August 23, 1988, President Reagan signed into law the
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (the "1988
Trade Act"),' including provisions facilitating the Uruguay
Round multilateral trade negotiations 2 and the so-called "Special 301."s A key aim of the Uruguay Round, and the sole aim
of Special 301, is to promote the adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights in foreign countries. The
Uruguay Round offers the opportunity to realize this goal
through a multilateral agreement with the trading partners of
the United States. Special 301, by contrast, is designed to use
the credible threat of unilateral retaliation by the United States
to "persuade" trading partners to reform currently deficient
intellectual property practices.
This Article will first review the Special 301 provisions and
• Mrs. Bello is a partner in Sidley & Austin's Washington, D.C. office and focuses on international trade regulation. She previously served as General Counsel to
the U.S. Trade Representative, among other positions in the Executive Branch.
** Mr. Holmer is a partner in Sidley & Austin's Washington, D.C. office, focusing on international trade regulation. He previously served as Deputy U.S. Trade
Representative (1987-1989) and General Counsel to the U.S. Trade Representative
(1985-1987), among other government positions.
1. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102
Stat. 1107 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.) [hereinafter 1988 Trade Act].
2. The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations is an ongoing effort to
amend and to strengthen the cornerstone international trade agreement, the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), openedfor signatureOct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
(pts. 5 & 6) A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187. The ongoing Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva, scheduled to conclude by the end of 1990,
was launched in September 1986 at a GATT Ministerial meeting in Punta del Este,
Uruguay (thus the reference to the "Uruguay Round" negotiations).
3. 1988 Trade Act, supra note 1, §§ 1301, 1303, 102 Stat. 1164-76, 1179-81
(1988) (amending the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-316, §§ 302(b), 182 (1974)).
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their implementation to date. The Article will then focus on
the relationship of the implementation of Special 301 to recent
developments in the Uruguay Round. The Article concludes
with an assessment of the significance and success so far of
Special 301.
I. CONCERNS ABOUT INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
SPECIAL 301
The importance of protecting intellectual property has escalated in recent years. Inadequate protection of creative
works-such as books, audio and video products, computer
software, and semiconductor layout designs-distorts trade
and prevents investors and other persons who rely on intellectual property protection from attracting capital and earning a
reasonable return on their investments. The U.S. International Trade Commission estimated that in 1986 alone, piracy
abroad of U.S. intellectual property resulted in sales losses by
U.S. companies between $43 and $61 billion. 4
Although the President and the Congress were frequently
at odds with each other during the Reagan era, each was nevertheless committed to adequately protecting intellectual property rights and to aggressively pursuing this end through international trade negotiations and revisions to existing U.S. trade
laws. In addition to amendments made to "generic" section
301, 5 the Generalized System of Preferences, 6 the Caribbean
Basin Economic Recovery Act,7 and the Export-Import Bank
Act,8 the Special 301 provisions of the 1988 Trade Act provided yet another means to this end.
The 1988 Trade Act expressly finds that the "international
protection of intellectual property rights is vital to the international competitiveness of United States persons that rely on
4. Foreign Protection of Intellectual Property Rights and the Effect on U.S.
Trade and Industry, USITC Pub. 2065, Inv. No. 332-TA-245, at Appendix H (Feb.
1988); see Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Admin. of
Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 31 (July 25, 1989)
[hereinafter Hearings] (statement of Carla A. Hills, U.S. Trade Representative).
5. See 1988 Trade Act, supra note 1, § 1301, 102 Stat. 1164-76 (1988) (codified
at 19 U.S.C. § 2411).
6. 19 U.S.C. § 2462 (1988).

7. Id. § 2702.
8. 12 U.S.C. § 635 (1988).
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protection of intellectual property rights." 9 It further stresses
that U.S. businesses that rely on intellectual property rights
must be ensured fair and equitable market access in foreign
countries in order to protect the economic interests of the
United States.' 0 Finally, the 1988 Trade Act indicates that the
purpose of Special 301 is to provide for the development of an
overall strategy to ensure that intellectual property rights and
market access for those who rely on such rights will be adequately and effectively protected."
President Reagan, in signing the 1988 Trade Act, stated
that Special 301 will "strengthen the ability of U.S. firms to
protect their patented, copyrighted, or trademarked goods and
ideas from international thievery." 12
A. The Requirements of Special 301
As enacted, Special 301 directs the U.S. Trade Representative (the "USTR"), within 30 days after the issuance of the
National Trade Estimate Report,' 3 to identify those foreign
countries that deny "adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights,"' 4 or deny "fair and equitable market
access to United States persons who rely upon intellectual
property protection.' 5 Special 301 further requires the
USTR to name as "priority foreign countries" those countries:
(i) whose acts, practices, or policies are the most onerous or
egregious,' 6 and have the greatest adverse economic impact on
the United States;' 7 and (ii) that are not entering into good
faith negotiations or making significant progress in bilateral or
multilateral negotiations to provide adequate and effective
8
protection of intellectual property rights.'
In identifying "priority foreign countries" pursuant to
9. 1988 Trade Act, supra note 1, § 1303(a)(1)(A), 102 Stat. 1179 (1988).
10. Id. § 1303(a)(1)(B), 102 Stat. 1179.
11. Id. § 1303(a)(2), 102 Stat. 1179.
12. President Reagan Signs Trade Bill Into Law, Saying Nation Now Speaks With One

Voice, 5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 54, at 1184 (Aug. 24, 1988).
13. The National Trade Estimate Report is required by 19 U.S.C. § 2241(b)

(1988).
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

19
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

U.S.C. § 2242(a)(1)(A) (1988).
§ 2242(a)(1)(B).
§ 2242(b)(1)(A).
§ 2242(b)(1)(B).
§ 2242(b)(1)(C ).
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Special 301, the USTR must consult with the Register of Copyrights, the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, and
other appropriate government officials.' 9 In an effort to clarify
the types of practices that the 1988 Trade Act was designed to
address, a U.S. House of Representatives conference report
listed a number of practices within the purview of Special
301 .2 0 They include, among other things, licensing procedures that restrict the free movement of products, expropriatory practices, and barriers erected to protect "cultural
21
sovereignty."1
Within thirty days after the USTR identifies "priority foreign countries," the USTR must initiate investigations into the
acts, practices, or policies of those "priority foreign countries."' 22 The USTR has only six months (and three additional
months if the investigation involves complex issues or if substantial progress is being made) to complete the investigation
and to seek to negotiate bilateral solutions. 23 If the acts, practices, or policies continue, the USTR is authorized, but is not
required, to retaliate by increasing duties or imposing other
restrictions on imports. 24 The USTR, however, is not required
to initiate a Special 301 investigation if such investigation
would be detrimental to U.S. economic interests.2 5
The USTR may designate additional "priority foreign
27
countries" at any time 26 as well as revoke such identification.
In the event of revocation, the, USTR must provide a detailed
explanation of the reasons for such revocation in its semi-annual report to Congress.2 8
While Special 301 compels the USTR to initiate Special
301 investigations of certain "priority foreign countries," it
nevertheless affords the USTR substantial discretion in determining which foreign countries engage in actionable activi19. Id. § 2242(b)(2)(A).
20. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 580-81, reprinted in 1988
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1547, 1613-14 [hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT].
21. Id., reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 1613-14.
22. 19 U.S.C. § 2412(b)(2)(A) (1988).
23. Id. § 2414(a)(3)(A)-(B).
24. Id. § 2416(b).
25. Id. § 2411 (a)(2)(B)(iv).
26. Id. § 2242(c)(1)(B).
27. Id. § 2242(c)(1)(A).
28. Id. § 2242(c)(2).
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ties,29 which of such countries are priorities, ° whether a Special 301 investigation would be detrimental to U.S. economic
interestsV3 and what response to actionable activities, if any, is
appropriate.3 2
Special 301, like its counterpart, "Super 301," the controversial and more commonly known provision of the 1988
Trade Act, 33 is designed to increase leverage for U.S. trade
negotiators seeking to promote international trade liberalization. Super 301, however, requires the USTR to probe into a
wider variety of unfair trade practices over a twelve- to eighteen-month period, in 1989 and in 1990 only.3 4 In contrast,
Special 301 is a permanent feature of the 1988 Trade Act, lacking the two-year sunset provision embedded in Super 301.
Moreover, Special 301 was devised solely to enhance the protection of intellectual property rights by foreign governments,
and it demands that investigations be conducted on an expe5
dited basis, faster than a normal section 301 investigation. 3
B. Legislative History of Special 301
The Special 301 requirements derive from both the House
and Senate omnibus trade bills. The House stressed the need
for
a comprehensive and effectiye program to address the
growing problem of piracy and counterfeiting faced in foreign markets by United States firms and industries. This
problem is not an isolated one affecting just one or two industries. It is a problem confronted by virtually all sectors
of the U.S. economy, including manufacturers of semiconductors and other high technology products, motion pic29. Id. § 2420(a)(1)(B), (a)(2).
30. Id. § 2420(a)(1)(A), (a)(3).
31. Id. §§ 2420(a)(2)(A), (a)(2).
32. Id. § 2414(a)(1)(B). The Conference Report urged the President and the
USTR to "endeavor to fashion a response in such a manner as to discourage the
erection of similar . . . barriers in other countries" in responding to the egregious
acts or practices of the "priority countries." CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at
581, reprinted in 1988 U.S CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1547, 1614.
33. 1988 Trade Act, supra note 1, § 1302, 102 Stat. 1176-79 (1988) (codified as
amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2420 (1988)).
34. 19 U.S.C. § 2420(a)(1) (1988).
35. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. Like investigations initiated under
Super 301, investigations launched under "normal" section 301 are conducted over a
twelve- to eighteen-month period. 19 U.S.C. § 2414 (1988).
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tures, computer software, books, records, auto parts,
pharmaceuticals, and chemicals. It also is a problem 3en6
countered in developed and developing countries alike.
The House and Senate bills were so similar in this regard
that there were only three notable differences between the two
bills. First, both the House and Senate bills covered denials of
adequate and effective protection of intellectual property
rights, but only the Senate bill covered in addition denials of
fair and equitable market access to U.S. persons who rely on
intellectual property protection.3 7 In the conference between
the House and Senate to resolve differences between the two
bills, the House receded to the Senate on this issue and the
market access provisions were included.3 8
Second, the House bill would have authorized a six-month
extension in Special 301 investigations involving complex issues. 30 The House receded to the Senate on this issue as well,
and Special 301 allows only a maximum three-month extension in complex cases.40
Finally, the Senate bill would not have "transferred" au36. H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 163 (1987). Similarly, the Senate
bill established
a comprehensive program, within the overall framework of Section 301, to
address the growing problem of inadequate and ineffective intellectual
property protection, and to address the unique foreign market access
problems of U.S. companies that rely upon intellectual property protection.
Improved protection and market access for U.S. intellectual property goes
to the very essence of economic competitiveness for the United States. The
problems of piracy, counterfeiting, and market access for U.S. intellectual
property affect the U.S. economy as a whole. Effective action against these
problems is important to sectors ranging from high technology to basic industries, and from manufacturers of goods to U.S. service businesses. The
list includes manufacturers of semiconductors and other electronic products, motion pictures, books, chemicals, computer software, records, and
pharmaceuticals.
S. REP. No. 71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1987).
37. S. 490, § 302 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 1420, § 302, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987); see S. REP. No. 71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1987).
38. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 580, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. ADMIN. NEWS 1547, 1613. Section 2 of the 1988 Trade Act provides that the
legislative history of H.R. 3 shall be treated as the legislative history of H.R. 4848, the
bill enacted as the 1988 Trade Act. 1988 Trade Act, supra note 1, § 2, 102 Stat. 1119
(1988).
39. H.R. 3, § 173, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); see H.R. REP. No. 40, 100th
Cong., Ist Sess. 163 (1987).
40. 19 U.S.C. § 2414(a)(3)(B) (1988); see CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1547, 1616.

583, reprinted in 1988 U.S.
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thority for action in Special 301 cases from the President to the
USTR. In the case of both Special 301 and "generic" section
301 cases, the Senate would have left statutory authority for
action exclusively with the President.4 1 The Senate, however,
receded to the House on the transfer of authority issue in both
Special 301 and "generic" section 301 cases.42 As a result, the
USTR is authorized to act "subject to the specific direction, if
43
any, of the President.9
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF SPECIAL 301
A. USTR May 25, 1989 Report
On May 25, 1989, Ambassador Carla A. Hills, the U.S.
Trade Representative, outlined the Administration's initial implementation of Special 301.44 Echoing the sentiment of Congress, Ambassador Hills observed that inadequate protection
of intellectual property rights not only harms the U.S. economy but also "undermines the creativity, invention and investment that are essential to economic and technological growth
45
in all countries."
Although the USTR recognized that much remains to be
done in obtaining adequate intellectual property rights protection from a number of U.S. trading partners, the agency
pointed out that significant agreements had been reached since
Special 301 was enacted.4 6 For example, the USTR noted that
during 1989, the People's Republic of China committed to
provide copyright protection for computer software, 4 7 Colombia resolved royalty remission problems related to motion pictures, 48 Taiwan agreed to solve copyright problems concern41. S. 490, § 305, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); S. 1420, § 305, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987); see S. REP. No. 71, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 79-80 (1987).
42. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 20, at 582-83, reprinted in 1988 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1547, 1615-16.
43. 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (a)(l),(b)(2) (1988).
44. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Fact Sheet "Special 301 "on
Intellectual Property, May 25, 1989 [hereinafter Fact Sheet] (copy on file at the Fordham
InternationalLaw Journal office), reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 718
(May 31, 1989).
45. Id. at 2, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 719 (May 31, 1989).
46. Id. at 3-4, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 719-20 (May 31,
1989).
47. Id. at 4, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 719 (May 31, 1989).
48. Id.
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ing motion pictures,4 9 and Saudi Arabia adopted a new patent

law.50
The USTR pointed to other significant achievements since
the enactment of Special 301, including a bilateral agreement
on copyright protection between the United States and Indonesia, 5 ' a positive "framework agreement" on intellectual
property rights resulting from the Uruguay Round mid-term
review,5 2 the submission by Chile of proposed patent law
amendments, including increased protection for pharmaceuticals, 5 3 and the submission by Indonesia of proposals for a patent law, including product protection for pharmaceuticals.5 4
Despite these accomplishments, the USTR stated that a
great deal remained to be achieved. The USTR noted that according to the 1989 National Trade Estimate Report, virtually
no U.S. trading partner satisfied the standards on intellectual
property protection proposed by the United States in the Uruguay Round. 55 The USTR, however, acknowledged that all of
the countries that could be designated as "priority foreign
countries" were engaged in good faith bilateral or multilateral
negotiations or were taking unilateral measures to protect in49. Id.
50. Id.; see Royal Decree No. M/38 of 10/6/1409 AH (The Patents Law) (English
translation on file at the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal office).
51. Fact Sheet, supra note 44, at 4, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at
720 (May 31, 1989); see Agreement on Copyright Protection, United States-Indonesia, Mar. 22, 1989 (copy on file at the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal office).
52. Fact Sheet, supra note 44, at 4, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at
720 (May 31, 1989).
53. Id.; see Durr, Chile Surrenders to U.S. Threat on Pharmaceutical Patents, Fin.
Times, Feb. 1, 1990, § 1, at 5 (noting that Chile passed a pharmaceutical patent law
on Jan. 31, 1990).
54. Fact Sheet, supra note 44, at 4, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at
720 (May 31, 1989); see Act of the Republic of Indonesia, No. 6, Nov. 1, 1989 (Patents); see also Gingerich, New Patent Law, East Asian Executive Rep., Dec. 1989, at 9
(discussing Indonesia's new patent law and noting that it will come into effect on
Aug. 1, 1991); Hearings, supra note 4, at 6.
55. Fact Sheet, supra note 44, at 2, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at
719 (May 31, 1989). The key objectives of the U.S. proposal in the Uruguay Round
are to reach a multilateral agreement that will establish minimum adequate substantive and enforcement standards and effective dispute settlement procedures and remedies. Topics set forth in the U.S. proposal for negotiations of substantive standards
include copyrights, patents, trademarks, trade secrets, and semiconductor chip layout
designs.
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tellectual property rights. 56 Consequently, in light of the progress that was being made in ongoing negotiations, the USTR
declined to identify any country as a "priority foreign country"
under Special 301.57
1. Priority Watch List and Watch List Countries
Rather than identifying countries as "priority foreign
countries" under Special 301, the USTR created a "priority
watch list" and a "watch list," naming countries that are particularly lax in their protection of intellectual property rights or
that have imposed barriers to market access. 58 The USTR
placed Brazil, India, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, the People's Republic of China, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, and Thailand
on the priority watch list.5 9 Seventeen other countries were
named to the watch list.6 0 The USTR stated that the decision
was reached after consulting closely with key sectors of the
business community that are affected by Special 301 .6 1 The
USTR added that the business community supported its decision.6 2
Accelerated action plans were announced for each country
on the priority watch list, and U.S. negotiators conducted intensified discussions with those countries until November 1,
1989.63 The USTR sought expeditious improvement in the
protection of intellectual property rights and the prevention of
piracy. The USTR announced that it would take remedial
steps to alleviate any remaining problems if further progress
was not made by November 1, 1989, taking into account the
objectives identified by the Administration in its accelerated
action plans and the U.S. proposals for intellectual property
56. Id. at 1, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 718-19 (May 31,
1989).
57. id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 3, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 719 (May 31, 1989).
The seventeen countries on the "watch list"were: Argentina, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Greece, Indonesia, Italy, Japan Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Portugal,
Spain, Turkey, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. Id., reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
No. 22, at 719 (May 31, 1989).
61. Id. at 1, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 719 (May 31, 1989).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 6, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at'720 (May 31, 1989).
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law protection in the Uruguay Round.6 4
In its May 25, 1989 announcement, the USTR identified a
number of areas in which the priority watch countries inadequately protected intellectual property rights. For example,
the USTR called for the government of Brazil to improve and
provide adequate patent protection for all classes of inventions. 65 Additionally, the USTR stressed the need for improved enforcement against piracy, the elimination of local
printing requirements for theatrical and television films, and
the constructive participation by Brazil in multilateral intellectual property negotiations.6 6
Concerning India, the USTR stressed the need to improve
patent protection for all classes of inventions, as well as the
need to eliminate discrimination against the use of foreign
trademarks.6 7 Further, the USTR noted that it would pursue
the registration of service marks, effective protection of wellknown marks, improved access and distribution for U.S. motion pictures, and improved enforcement against piracy. 68 Finally, the USTR flagged the importance of India's constructive
participation in multilateral intellectual property negotiations
and bilateral negotiations aimed at concluding an intellectual
property agreement between the United States and India.6 9
Concerning the Republic of Korea, the USTR emphasized
the enforcement of Korea's existing patent, trademark, and
copyright laws and administrative measures covered by agreements between the United States and the Republic of Korea. 70
However, the USTR also stated that it would follow closely the
Republic of Korea's participation in intellectual property negotiations in the Uruguay Round.7 '
As far as Mexico is concerned, the USTR reported its aim
to use the threat of remedial action under Special 301 to
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 7, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 720 (May 31, 1989);
see Extension of the Science and Technology Initiative Between India and the United
States, Oct. 5, 1988 (copy on file at the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal office).
70. Fact Sheet, supra note 44, at 7, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at
720 (May 31, 1989).
71. Id.
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achieve improved and adequate patent protection for all
classes of inventions and constructive participation by Mexico
in multilateral intellectual property negotiations. v2
The People's Republic of China was also singled out as a
priority watch list country under Special 301. 73 The USTR
said it would seek from the Chinese government the enactment
of a copyright law, including coverage for computer software,
the establishment of copyright relations with the United States,
and improved and adequate protection for all classes of inventions. 4
Additionally, the USTR stated that it would use Special
301 as an impetus to encourage Saudi Arabia to enact a copyright law, including protection for computer software and
sound recordings. 75 The USTR further recommended that
Saudi Arabia establish copyright relations with the United
States and effectively enforce laws against piracy and counterfeiting of U.S. works.7 6
The USTR reported that although Taiwan and the United
States had made significant progress in strengthening
Taiwanese intellectual property laws, several areas of concern
remained. Specifically, the USTR said it would seek more rigorous enforcement of Taiwan's patent, copyright, and trademark laws, 77 and the implementation of measures to fulfill
Taiwanese obligations under the recent bilateral agreements
on copyright and on other intellectual property rights. 8
The USTR also noted that it would monitor developments
in intellectual property protection in Thailand until November
1, 1989. 7 In particular, the U.S. negotiators determined they
would focus on achieving improved patent protection for all
inventions and effective copyright protection for U.S. works,
including software.8 0 Moreover, the USTR stated that it would
also watch for improved protection of foreign trademarks and
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 719 (May 31, 1989).
74. Id. at 7, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 720 (May 31, 1989).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 7-8, reprintedin 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 720 (May 31, 1989).
77. Id. at 8, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 720 (May 31, 1989).
78. Id.; see infra note 91 and accompanying text.
79. Fact Sheet, supra note 44, at 8, reprinted in 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at
721 (May 31, 1989).
80. Id.
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constructive participation in multilateral intellectual property
negotiations. 8 '
2. Trade Improvements Due to Special 301
Finally, in its May 25, 1989 announcement, the USTR
stressed that some significant improvements in protecting intellectual property rights had been realized already through
the bilateral discussions prompted by Special 301. Taiwanese
officials, for instance, agreed to make positive efforts to protect
intellectual property.8 2 The USTR stated that responsible
Taiwanese authorities would handle individual cases of infringement of intellectual property and supply statistical data
on piracy and counterfeiting to U.S. officials on a regular basis.8 3 The USTR also called upon private industry in Taiwan
to honor existing laws.8 4 Similarly, Saudi Arabia took steps to
enact copyright legislation covering books, music, audio and
video recordings, art, and computer software.8 5
B. USTR's November 1, 1989 Interim Review
On November 1, 1989, the USTR announced the results
of its interim Special 301 review (the "Interim Review").8 6
Once again, it did not designate any trading partner as a priority foreign country under Special 301. Of the eight counties
initially named to the priority watch list, three (the Republic of
Korea, Taiwan, and Saudi Arabia) were removed from the pri87
ority watch list and placed on the more basic watch list.
The Interim Review also noted the Republic of Korea's
"steady progress" toward improving the enforcement of intellectual property rights, 8 including the creation of a task force
to improve coordination between ministries on intellectual
property rights issues, the designation of special enforcement
81. Id.
82. ROC-U.S. Talks Over "Special 301" End With Success, Central News Agency
(June 20, 1989) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Cenews file).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See USTR Announces Intellectual Property "Watch Lists", 12 Middle East Execu-

tive Reports, No. 6, at 9 (June 1989); infra note 95 and accompanying text..
86. Hills Announces Results of Special 301 Review (Nov. 1, 1989) [hereafter Interim
Review] (copy on file at the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal office).

87. Id. at 1.
88. Id. at 4.
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teams of police and prosecutors, and
the "vigorous" search,
89
seizure and prosecution of violators.
Concerning Taiwan, the Interim Review stressed Taiwan's
"substantial progress" in enforcement matters and "a strong
commitment" to improving the environment for protection of
intellectual property rights. 90 In particular, the USTR noted
Taiwan's initialing of a bilateral copyright agreement, 9 issuance of a senior-level public policy statement stressing the importance of intellectual property protection,9 2 establishment of
regional task forces of police and prosecutors,93 and imposition of sanctions against infringers.94
The USTR further noted the Administration's understanding that Saudi Arabia would enact a copyright law by
early November 1989, 95 in terms compatible with obligations
established in the Berne Convention.96 The USTR also stated
its expectation that the same obligation will apply to computer
software as well as to other literary works.9 7
The other five countries placed on the priority watch list
on May 25, i989-Brazil, India, Mexico, the People's Republic
of China, and Thailand-remained on that list. 9 8 Similarly, the

seventeen countries placed on the watch list on May 25, 1989
remained on it. 99 Moreover, the USTR noted "disturbing de89. Id.
90. Id. at 4.
91. Id.; see Agreement for the Protection of Copyright Between the American
Institute in Taiwan and the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (initialed July 1989) (copy on file at the Fordham InternationalLaw Journal office).
92. Interim Review, supra note 86, at 4.
93. Id.
94. Id.

95. Id. at 3. Saudi Arabia enacted this copyright law on Dec. 17, 1989, to take
effect on Jan. 12, 1990. See Royal Decree No. M/I I of 19/5/14 10 AH. An unofficial

English translation of this law can be found in 13 Middle East Executive Reports, No.
2, at 23 (Feb. 1990). See Johnson & Cassin, New Saudi Copyright Law, 13 Middle East
Executive Reports, No. 2, at 9 (Feb. 1990).
96. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, reprinted in World Intellectual Property Organization, Guide to the Berne Convention (1978). The complete text of the Berne Convention may also be found in N.
BooRSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW 715-37 (1981) and 4 M. NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, Appen-

dix 27-1 (1984).
97. Interim Review, supra note 86, at 3. The USTR also noted the need for clarification of some provisions of the law, including, for example, the need to protect
sound recordings for a term of at least fifty years. Id.
98. Id. at 2, 4.
99. Id.
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velopments" in Turkey and "slow progress" in Malaysia, which
it stated would require "special attention" and stepped-up efforts.'00
The USTR concluded the Interim Review with a commitment to continue to press for improvements from all twentyfive countries on either the priority watch list or the watch list,
from the date of the Interim Review until the next Special 301
review required by late April 1990.101 The USTR emphasized
that it would pay particular attention to the contributions of
those countries and their positions in the Uruguay Round ne0 2
gotiations on trade related intellectual property rights.1
III. SPECIAL 301's EFFECTS ON URUGUAY ROUND
NEGOTIATIONS
Although Special 301 has achieved progress bilaterally,
some trading partners initially expressed their concerns that
Special 301 would jeopardize the progress of Uruguay Round
negotiations on the protection of intellectual property. For example, on June 21, 1989, the Minister Counselor of the Brazilian Embassy in Washington maintained not only that Special
301 was undermining the progress of the Uruguay Round, but
also stated that it was illegal under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade ("GATT").10 3 He argued further that it violated the Punta del Este standstill provision, 0 4 prohibiting unilateral imposition of new laws or policies not yet covered by
05
the GATF.
Moreover, the Minister Counselor asserted that the bilateral approach embodied in Special 301 makes it difficult for
participants in the Uruguay Round to believe that the United
100. Id. at 4.
101. Id.at 5.
102. Id.
103. U.S. Special 301 Process Undermining GATT,Hurts U.S. Credibility, Brazil Official
Says, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 120, at A-2 (June 23, 1989).
104. Id. at A-3. The GATT Ministers pledged at the September 1986 meeting
not to increase existing trade-distorting measures, but rather to "standstill" pending
the outcome of these negotiations. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Ministerial Declarationon Uruguay Round, at 4-5 (Sept. 20, 1986) (copy on file at the Fordham
International Law Journal office). The standstill pledge, however, is a political, not
legal, undertaking.
105. U.S. Special 301 Process Undermining GA TT, Hurts U.S. Credibility, Brazil Official
Says, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 120, at A-3 (June 23, 1989).
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States intends to negotiate within the GATT framework."0 6
Citing another alleged flaw in Special 301, he argued that the
United States should not treat lesser developed countries in
the same manner that it treats a developed state, by expecting
it to have laws as stringent and as firmly established as those in
the United States.' 0 7 The USTR sought to allay this particular
concern, assuring foreign countries that U.S. objectives under
Special 301 are flexible and reflect "an understanding that
countries may be at different stages in recognizing the importance of adequate and effective intellectual property protec8
tion."

0

India also has expressed serious reservations about the
progress of multilateral negotiations as long as the threat of
bilateral action exists.10 9 The European Economic Community
agreed with Brazil and India, contending that negotiations on
the prevention of piracy and the protection of intellectual
property rights will be viable only if the participants feel they
are negotiating without coercion.''
Although many U.S. trading partners disapprove of Special 301 and are concerned about its effects on the intellectual
property negotiations in the Uruguay Round, the USTR
sought to implement Special 301 in a manner designed to
complement rather than contradict U.S. objectives on intellectual property rights protection in the Uruguay Round. Ambassador Hills has stated that the "[b]ilateral negotiations and actions we have taken under our domestic legal procedures, including section 301, are fully complementary to our Uruguay
Round objectives.""' Responding to an inquiry about the effect of the USTR's decision to name priority watch list countries under Special 301, Ambassador Hills maintained that the
USTR's office will monitor the Uruguay Round negotiations
closely to ensure that they are conducted in good faith and that
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Fact Sheet, supra note 44, at 2, reprinted in 6 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22,
at 719 (May 31, 1989).
109. Trade. "TRIPRS" Negotiations On Collision Course, Warns India, Inter Press
Service (July 13, 1989) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Intrad file).

110. Id.
11. See Hearings, supra note 4, at 23.
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significant progress is made." 2 She added that U.S. objectives
3
have not changed and are fully consistent with Special 301.
Addressing foreign concerns that Special 301 violates
GATT, the Assistant USTR for Services, Investment and Intellectual Property Rights (who also serves as Team Leader for
the Uruguay Round intellectual property negotiations) asserted that GATT's current lack of coverage of intellectual
property does not tie the Administration's hands. 1 4 He did,
however, note that this consideration will be factored into any
decision made by the USTR." 5 He additionally pointed out
that one reason no countries were identified as priority foreign
countries under Special. 301 is because they are participating in
good faith in the ongoing negotiations at the Uruguay
6
Round. 1
CONCLUSION
The current Administration's implementation of Special
301 to date has been a ten-strike. Despite the concerns expressed by many trading partners, the United States has enhanced the leverage of its negotiators, stimulated the negotiations, and thus increased the prospects for achieving an adequate GATT agreement on the protection of intellectual
property rights. The enactment of Special 301 and the Administration's commitment to its faithful implementation underscore that pirates will no longer be tolerated, and that U.S. intellectual property cannot be stolen with impunity. Special
301 provides useful muscle for the negotiations in Geneva.
Further, the USTR's artful application of Special 301 to
date has not unduly jeopardized the Uruguay Round negotiations. In fact, Special 301 contemplates the prospect of possible unilateral U.S. action only if the United States fails to make
progress in this area, either bilaterally or in Geneva. The
threat of such recourse serves as an incentive for otherwise reluctant trading partners to negotiate in good faith. At the
112. Fact Sheet, supra note 44, at 9, reprintedin 6 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at
721 (May 31, 1989).
113. Id.
114. U.S. Special 301 Process Undermining GATT, Hurts U.S. Credibility, Brazil Official
Says, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 120, at A-3 (June 23, 1989).
115. Id.
116. d.
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same time, the judicious restraint exercised by the Administration in the initial implementation of Special 301 underscores
the U.S. commitment to the Uruguay Round negotiations.
While a good beginning does not guarantee a successful
conclusion, the Administration's use of Special 301 is at least
well launched. So long as the Administration can refrain from
taking harsher action under Special 301 for the duration of the
Uruguay Round negotiations, Special 301 is unlikely to damage those negotiations and thus unlikely to harm the prospects
for achieving a satisfactory multilateral GATT agreement on
protecting intellectual property. And so long as the current
Administration gets results or, at a minimum, makes clear and
concrete progress in the negotiations, it will likely enjoy the
continued support of Congress and the private sector.
However, the continued ability to keep nearly everyone
happy concerning intellectual property protection depends on
the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round by the end of
1990. If a satisfactory agreement on intellectual property is
not achieved in 1990, the USTR will be hard pressed by both
Congress and the private sector to identify priority foreign
countries in the application of Special 301 in 1991 and beyond.
On the other hand, if a generally satisfactory agreement is
achieved but Special 301 is nonetheless retained and implemented in a manner inconsistent with that agreement, the international community's response will be swift and harsh.

